Beyond the unitary state? Public opinion, political institutions and public policy in Brittany by Cole, Alistair Mark & Loughlin, John
This is an Open Access document downloaded from ORCA, Cardiff University's institutional
repository: http://orca.cf.ac.uk/98825/
This is the author’s version of a work that was submitted to / accepted for publication.
Citation for final published version:
Cole, Alistair Mark and Loughlin, John 2003. Beyond the unitary state? Public opinion, political
institutions and public policy in Brittany. Regional Studies 37 (3) , pp. 265-276.
10.1080/0034340032000065424 file 
Publishers page: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0034340...
<http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/0034340032000065424>
Please note: 
Changes made as a result of publishing processes such as copy-editing, formatting and page
numbers may not be reflected in this version. For the definitive version of this publication, please
refer to the published source. You are advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite
this paper.
This version is being made available in accordance with publisher policies. See 
http://orca.cf.ac.uk/policies.html for usage policies. Copyright and moral rights for publications
made available in ORCA are retained by the copyright holders.
Beyond the Unitary State? 
Public Opinion, Political Institutions and Public 
Policy in Brittany 
 
Alistair Cole and John Loughlin 
 
 
 
 
School of European Studies 
Cardiff University, CF10 3YG 
Wales-UK 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contact details: Professor Alistair Cole, EUROS,  PO Box 908, Cardiff CF10 3YG. 
Tel: +44 (0)29 20 87 50 68. Fax +44 (0) 29 20 87  49 46. E.Mail: 
ColeA@Cardiff.ac.uk 
 2 
 
Abstract 
 
This article investigates the new regionalism in Brittany, one of France’s historic 
regions.  It is based on findings from a mass opinion survey carried out in July 2001, 
as well as on insights drawn from over 70 semi-structured interviews. The 
quantitative and qualitative evidence is interpreted through reference to four 
hypotheses, concerning issues of Breton identity, autonomy, pragmatism and political 
opportunity structures. While our findings allow us to establish the pertinence of the 
new regionalist problematic in Brittany, we conclude that in the French case theories 
of ‘new regionalism’ must be understood within the framework of an overarching 
state tradition that regulates and channels regional pressures and creates strong 
incentives for a system of national political regulation.  
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Since 1945, the “regional question” has rarely been off academic and political 
agendas. However, the way in which the question has been conceptualised and 
political and public policy approaches to it have varied quite considerably. During the 
heyday of the Welfare State, “regions” were generally viewed as objects of policies 
designed by national governments to bring about a convergence of economically 
weaker regions with the most advanced. The basic aim of this approach was, from a 
political perspective, to produce integrated national polities and, from an economic 
perspective, to bring into productivity those territorial regions that had fallen behind. 
The expectation during this period on the part of political elites and most academic 
theorists was that regions would be eventually assimilated into a homogenous state 
system. “Regionalism”, and, a fortiori, “ethnic nationalism”, were viewed as 
expressions of political backwardness and conservatism. This was especially the case 
in France. It was not surprising, therefore, that the first regionalist movements  
developed as movements, which were primarily concerned with formulating a 
political project that was in line with this dominant thinking and, only secondarily, 
with protecting their traditional languages and cultures. Brittany was an exemplar in 
this regard as we show below.  
 
By the 1990s, the context throughout Europe had changed radically. After a period of 
about twenty years in which a number of wider forces – globalisation, 
Europeanisation, neo-liberalism, new public management approaches – had reshaped 
the nature, role and functions of nation-states, the “regional question” came to be 
formulated quite differently from the early 1960s. By this time, the top-down regional 
policies of the Keynesian state had given way to a new bottom-up model of regional 
development, based on notions such as the “innovative” or “learning” regions, where 
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regions became political actors in their right and were engaged in a situation of 
competitive regionalism. This time the framework in which these processes were 
occurring was no longer simply the nation-state (although this remains a key frame or 
reference) but a wider context encompassing the European Union and also the wider 
international arena. Although there was some early interest in the notion of a “Europe 
of the Regions” this soon gave way to a more realistic appraisal which toned down the 
issue to a recognition that regions (and other sub-national authorities) are now key 
players in a wider system of European governance. At the same time, national 
governments remain even more important players alongside the supranational 
institutions of the European Union. The nature and consequences of these changes is 
still the subject of a vast debate in the social sciences. In any case, it is possible to 
speak today of a “new regionalism” although this term is used in different ways to 
cover a wide variety of normative and analytical positions with regard to “the regional 
question” (Keating and Loughlin, 1997,  Keating 1998,  Loughlin, 2001) 
 
This article investigates the new regionalism in Brittany, one of France’s historic 
regions. It forms part of a much larger project comparing processes of regional 
governance in Wales and Brittany, in which we investigate devolution and 
decentralisation as two alternative forms of regional institution building undertaken in 
two states – France and the United Kingdom – with distinctive non-federal (unitary or 
union) traditions. 1  Though both devolution and decentralisation were initially 
                                                          
1
 The research project from which this article is drawn investigates processes of regional governance in 
two cognate yet distinctive regions: Wales and Brittany. We compare the politics, policies and polity 
building dynamics of devolution in Wales and decentralisation in the French region of Brittany. In 
particular, we compare three distinct dimensions of the policy system: policy communities (through in-
depth interviews in the two regions),  issue-networks (via a detailed questionnaire); and public opinion 
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envisaged as new technocratic forms of steering at a distance, each has assumed a 
specific character dependent in part upon narrow institutional arrangements, but also 
more generally upon political opportunity structures, the distribution of social capital, 
the linkages between identities and institutions and the nature of territorial policy 
                                                                                                                                                                      
(through a mass opinion poll carried out in both regions in July-August 2001).  This article presents 
preliminary attitudinal data from the Brittany poll. The research is part of an ESRC-financed project on 
‘Devolution and Decentralisation in Wales and Brittany’ (Grant number L 219 25 2007). We thank the 
council for its support. Market Research Wales and Efficience 3 simultaneously carried out the  public 
opinion surveys  in Wales and Brittany in June and July 2001. A representative sample of 1007, 
selected by quotas of age, gender, socio-economic group and locality, was interviewed in each region.  
We also carried out 72 interviews in Brittany from April-September 2001. These interviews were taped 
and transcribed. They lasted an average of one hour. We identified three types of actor: regional 
political actors, language policy actors and  training policy actors. We started  with several names 
suggested to us by our advisory group and then relied upon the snowball technique to ensure a wide 
coverage.  We thank all our interviewees for their co-operation, as well as the following organisations: 
AGEFAFORIA, AGEFOS-PME, ANPE, AREF-BTP,  ARIFOPE,  Association of Breton-speaking 
firms,  Association ‘Identité Bretonne’, Brittany Chamber of Agriculture, Brittany Chamber of 
Commerce, Brittany Cultural Council, Brittany Cultural Institute,  Brittany Economic and Social 
Chamber,  Brittany Regional Council,  Brittany Regional Prefecture (SGAR),  CEREQ, CFDT, CIJB, 
Communes of Lorient, Nantes, Rennes, Carhaix and Chateaugiron, DASTUM, DIHUN,   DIORENN,  
DIV’YEZH,  DIWAN, Education ministry, European Bureau of Lesser Used languages,  FR3,  Helio 
Ouest SA,  Kuzul ar Brezhoneg,  Labour and training ministry,  Local Mission Rennes, Ofis ar 
Brezhoneg,  OPCA-REG,  Pays de la Loire Regional Council, PLI,  Projet NEC,  PS, Quimper 
Chamber of Commerce, Rennes Chamber of Commerce, Rennes University (1), Rennes University (2),  
Saveol, SA,  Skol  Ober,   Skol an Emsav,  STUMDI,  TES, TIAVRO,  TV Breizh,  UPIB and the 
Youth and Sports ministry. 
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problems. Through comparison within and across nations, we will eventually provide  
a framework for considering new regionalism within unitary states. 
 
It makes much more sense to test for the emergence of  a new regionalism in  a 
traditionally unitary state such as France, or a union state such as the UK,  than in 
states with longer established federal (Germany) or regionalist (Spain) traditions, 
where one would expect strong regional institutions. We started with a number of  
working hypotheses designed to uncover the existence or otherwise of a regional 
Breton identity, its linkage with institutional and policy preferences and the likely 
future institutional development of regionalism in France.  
 
Our first hypothesis was that Breton identity is weak, and, by implication, debate 
about the new regionalism is misplaced in France.  We rejected this hypothesis from 
the outset. The Paris-based Observatoire interrégional du politique (OIP) has been 
tracking support for regional political institutions in France from 1986 onwards. In the 
annual OIP survey, Brittany consistently emerges as the mainland French region with 
the strongest sense of its own identity. Through selecting Brittany, we are consciously 
studying a highly distinctive region within a nation-state -  France -  that is usually 
taken as the paradigm of a strong central state. A second hypothesis, long consistent 
with official attitudes within the French state, is that there is no demand for enhanced 
regional autonomy, a hypothesis we test (and reject) below.  
 
A third hypothesis (consistent with the traditional French republican models) posited 
that citizens in Brittany were likely to adopt an instrumental or pragmatic stance 
towards extending the domain of regional policy intervention, though this in no way 
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implied the absence of regional consciousness. Bretons have traditionally placed their 
faith in the French state (rather than Breton authorities) to deliver public goods,  
convinced that Brittany has fared well from the top-down, centralised pattern of 
territorial management.  Playing up Breton identity serves a useful function, insofar as 
it encourages the central state to channel scarce resources to its peripheral, and 
potentially rebellious region. This hypothesis presupposes that Bretons fall on the 
instrumental side of the instrumental/identity spectrum and that they are conscious of 
the limits of regional capacity building within the context of French republicanism.  
 
Moving from the electorate, stricto sensu, to the wider policy community, a fourth 
hypothesis focuses upon the political opportunity structure. As political parties 
aggregate interests,  so parties are more likely to shape voter preferences than the 
other way around. National parties, rather than regionally specific ones have always 
dominated the Breton political scene. Bretons have been spectacularly successful in 
positioning themselves as national leaders  - in all parties – and have had  little to gain 
by raising symbolic divisive issues such as language or enhanced devolution.  
Brittany’s political elite has adapted to the French logic of territorial decentralisation, 
having itself had a major influence in forcing decentralisation onto the political 
agenda, and in obtaining disproportionate resources through playing up, within limits, 
its territorial distinctiveness. This model of influence is a traditional one of bringing 
pressure to bear in Paris. 
  
Both the first and the second hypotheses allow us – by their refutation - to establish 
the pertinence of the new regionalist problematic in the Breton case.  In the case of 
the third and fourth hypotheses, theories of ‘new regionalism’ must be understood 
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within the framework of an overarching state tradition that regulates and channels 
regional pressures and creates strong incentives for a system of national political 
regulation.  We consider the pertinence of these hypotheses in the conclusion.  First, 
we set out the context of regionalism in France and the specific characteristics of the 
Brittany region. 
 
Regionalism in France  
 
Regionalisation in France dates back to the late 1950s but reached its high point in the 
period 1982-1986 with the setting up of elected regional councils as part of a wider 
programme of decentralisation (Cole and John, 2001, Loughlin and Mazey, 1995). 
The regional institution in France is the result of a long process of what might be 
called “creeping institutionalisation” as it was gradually (and grudgingly) granted a 
position in the politico-administrative system alongside the départements and the 
communes. The regional institution was established while retaining the longer 
established and, in many ways, more powerful départements. Large cities and towns 
had also become powerful levels of sub-national government (Hoffmann Martinot, 
1999, Le Galès, 1995). The regions might, therefore, be considered the ‘poor cousins” 
of French sub-national government. 
 
To a large extent, the 1982 reforms were carried out in the context of the Welfare 
State approaches, which we identified above. These reforms considerably modified 
the French politico-administrative landscape and its system of central-local relations 
although not particularly through making them more transparent and coherent. On the 
contrary, decentralisation and regionalisation have produced a rather chaotic and 
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unclear situation in which different levels of government and different actors, 
including the field services of the central state, compete for scarce resources. 
Consistent with the territorial management policies of the post-war French state, 
French administrative regions were first established in the 1950s as technocratic 
advisory bodies to assist in strategic functions of economic development,  
transportation and territorial planning. They have been fully operational sub-national 
authorities only since 1986, with their main (limited) responsibilities in economic 
development, transportation, education, training and culture. French regions were 
created in a standardised form throughout the French territory, including in areas 
where no regional tradition existed.  The Region of the Centre thus enjoys exactly the 
same prerogatives as Brittany. Regional boundaries do not usually respect the 
informal boundaries of France’s historic regions. To institutionalise France’s historic 
regions would be tantamount to admitting the posthumous existence of a union state 
of the UK variety, rather than the French unitary version.  This highlights the 
technocratic nature of French decentralisation; proximity would produce more 
effective decision-making, but was not intended to give rise to ‘communautarian’ or 
regionalist identities.  
 
Decentralisation was intended to promote local democracy and administrative 
efficiency, not to challenge the underlying principles of the French unitary state, 
although some of the older regionalist demands (e.g. a Corsican Statut Particulier) 
were taken on board while others (e.g. a unified Basque département) were quietly 
dropped. We should note that administrative ‘deconcentration’  (the creation of the 
regional prefectures in 1964) preceded political decentralisation by two decades. This 
 10 
is important, as the tentacular French State has never abandoned its territorial 
ambitions. 
 
Some of the regional councils such as Rhône-Alpes (despite its artificial character and 
lack of regional identity) have succeeded in carving out a niche for themselves as 
“strong” regions, while others, such as Languedoc-Roussillon, have manifestly failed 
to do so. Brittany, today finds itself somewhere in the middle of these two extremes. 
The term “region”, as applied to Brittany,  is ambiguous as it can refer to both the 
institution embodied in the current regional council with its four departments (Côtes-
d’Armor, Finistère, Ille-et-Vilaine and Morbihan) and to the geographically wider 
historic “region”, including the Loire Atlantique département, corresponding more or 
less to the ancient Duchy of Brittany. The survey on which this article is based was 
carried out in the area covered by the existing region, known sometimes as B4.  This 
article presents some preliminary findings of the attitude survey we carried out in 
Brittany. These findings illustrate what people living in Brittany think of their region 
and how they envisage its future development. The article is structured around three 
groups of questions asked in the survey.  Where should decisions be made? What are 
the priorities for regional public expenditure? How does public opinion envisage 
future institutional developments?  In the conclusion, we address the possible 
implications of our findings for the future development of the French polity. We begin 
with a brief presentation of politics in post-war Brittany. 
 
Brittany: a French Region with a Difference  
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One of the most distinctive regions of France, Brittany has a strong sense of its 
specific position within French society.  Formerly an independent Duchy (from 818 to 
1532), then a French province with special prerogatives (1532-1789), reduced for 
long to being a collection of disparate départements before becoming an 
administrative then political region, modern Brittany is a French region with a 
difference. Unlike many other French regions, it can look to its past existence as an 
independent political entity, with its own founding myths and political institutions. 
Though the symbols of statehood have long been repressed, the region retains many 
distinctive characteristics. The Breton language is the European continent’s only 
Celtic language. The enduring symbolic importance of the Catholic religion is ever 
present physically in the architecture of Breton villages, as well in higher than average 
rates of religious practice. The spectacular growth of Breton cultural movements 
(dance, theatre, costume, and music) is testament to a revival of Breton values and 
self-consciousness.   
 
At a more abstract level, observers have noted the capacity of Breton actors to join 
forces to promote their common interests and to defend Brittany against attacks from 
the outside world. Breton solidarity can also be gauged more intuitively by the 
effectiveness of Breton elite-level networks in Paris and Brussels, and by the 
importance of the Breton Diaspora in retaining a sense of distinctiveness.  Breton 
politicians have been especially assertive in the defence of Breton interests in Paris.  
From 1950 onwards, Breton actors of all political persuasions co-operated closely in 
the CELIB  - Comité de d’étude et de liaison des intérêts bretons –  the archetype of a 
post-war  regional advocacy coalition.  The CELIB could claim the credit for many of 
the improvements in transport infrastructure consented to the Brittany region in the 
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1960s and 1970s. Lobbying Paris to obtain resources for Brittany represented a 
regional adaptation of traditional Welfare-oriented intergovernmental models,  
theorised with talent by Crozier and Thoenig (1975).  
 
If all main political tendencies have been well represented in post-war Brittany 
(except the Front national) the prevalent post-war political tradition is best described 
as one of political centrism. In the immediate post-war period, Brittany was the 
birthplace and one of the bastions of French Christian democracy and, though in 
decline, powerful vestiges remain. With the creation of the Fifth Republic, it could not 
resist the national pull of Gaullism, though Gaullism only slowly created a space for 
itself in local government.  Brittany also contributed markedly to the rise of the new 
Socialist Party (PS) from the 1970s onwards, with the Socialist Party in Brittany 
subtly imbued with values representative of the underlying Breton political culture 
(left Catholicism, social partnership, links with voluntary associations) (Hanley, 1984, 
Sawicki, 1993). The French Communist Party (PCF) also established its own 
strongholds in the ‘red triangle’ of north-west and central Brittany and was supportive 
from an early date of many of the Breton movement’s ‘anti-colonial’ demands 
(Lebesque, 1970). Long resistant to national trends, the recent decline of the PCF in 
Brittany represents the beginning of the end of an original model of rural communism, 
largely to the benefit of the PS. Only the far-right National Front  (FN) has failed to 
establish solid bases in Brittany, notwithstanding Jean-Marie Le Pen’s Breton origins. 
The case of the FN illustrates well the innate cohesion of Breton political culture. 
Having been spared the ravages of excessive urbanisation, industrial decline and 
unemployment, Brittany’s social networks have remained largely intact, providing a 
barrier to the breakthrough of the far-right movement. The persistence of Catholicism 
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and weak immigration are also powerful explanatory factors, as the Catholic clergy at 
all levels explicitly opposed racist and xenophobic attitudes among their followers.  
 
The dominant political culture is one of political accommodation. Breton politicians 
of all parties, however divided they are internally, will tend to close ranks against 
threats from the outside. Despite a strong regional identity, Brittany has not produced 
significant regionalist parties, or at least parties that have been capable of winning 
seats in departmental, regional or national elections. Only one left-wing regionalist 
party, the Democratic Breton Union (UDB) has managed some victories at the 
municipal level and then usually in collaboration with the PS.  This apparent paradox 
might be explained by the predominance of the consensual political traditions 
mentioned above. Le Coadic (1998)  interprets this phenomenon as a consequence of 
the deeply rooted legitimist strand within Breton public opinion. Imbued by a 
Catholic, conformist ethic, the Breton public is not prepared to support pro-
independence or pro-autonomist parties. This conformist sentiment is reflected in the 
modest scores obtained in elections by the UDB and the smaller Breton regional or 
autonomist parties. We should also note that the mainstream political parties in 
Brittany, especially the PS but also the UDF and RPR, have adopted regionalist 
themes and are more “regionalist” than their national counterparts. This is true even of 
the RPR President of the Brittany Region, Josselin De Rohan, who has a much more 
“regionalist” discourse than his RPR colleagues in most of the rest of France. 
Although Breton regionalism has, at times, been violent, this never reached the levels 
experienced in Corsica, the Spanish Basque country or Northern Ireland.   
 
We now look at where decisions should be made in more detail.  
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Where should decisions be made? Public Opinion and Political Institutions in 
Brittany 
 
We will now examine the attitudes of the general population towards the regional 
institution as it functions at present and how it ought to develop. It is against the 
backdrop of twenty years of partial and untidy decentralisation in a traditionally 
unitary state that we undertook our fieldwork in Brittany. As a preliminary to 
answering our question ‘where should decisions be made’, we sought first to establish 
the degree of trust that existed in the Brittany Regional Council as its currently 
functions.  The results are presented in Table One.  
 
--- Table One around here --- 
 
Table One reveals a high measure of trust in the Brittany regional council as a 
political institution, despite its limited powers. Trust evokes sentiments of honesty, a 
culture of co-operation and a high level of social capital. One would expect Brittany 
to score highly on such a measure, given the importance of co-operative movements 
(in mutual banks and agricultural co-operatives) and consensual Breton political 
traditions. There is also overwhelming support for the principle of decentralisation, a 
theme we develop in more detail below. These findings suggest a strong political 
capital for the Brittany Region, evidence consistent with the conclusions of the annual 
regional surveys conducted by the Paris-based Observatoire Interrégional du 
Politique.  From 1995 to 1999, Bretons were consistently amongst the most 
enthusiastic ‘regionalists’ in France and were the most likely to identify the Brittany 
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region as an historic entity. Our findings suggest a strong groundswell of general 
support for regional political institutions in Brittany.  
 
Bretons do not simply identify their region with the geographical boundaries of the 
current regional institution (B4) but see it as also including the fifth “lost” 
département of Loire-Atlantique. This is shown by the responses to our question on 
the reunification of the five départements. Our poll suggests powerful public support 
for the reunification of historic Brittany (over 62 per cent strongly in favour or in 
favour) , a sentiment shared across the political and geographical spectrum, with only 
minor variations according to département, partisan allegiance or other variables. 
There was heightened awareness of this issue during fieldwork in Brittany. On 30 
June 2001 – forty years after the division of historic Brittany – a mass demonstration 
took place in Nantes in favour of reunification. The Loire Atlantique departmental 
council then unanimously voted a motion in favour of being incorporated into 
Brittany. Unanimity was short-lived, however, as in October 2001, the Rennes 
municipal council  opposed unification: a reunified Brittany would challenge the 
leading role of the Breton capital. 
 
---Table Two around here --- 
 
This general support for the regional level is confirmed in the specific areas of policy 
decisions regarding the Breton language and training policy. The comparative project 
from which this article is drawn focuses in part on these two policy issue-areas where  
a strong case can be made for regional policy action,  either on the basis of proximity 
or identity.  This claim is born out in our comparative surveys. Public opinion in 
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Brittany (and Wales) strongly believes that the regional authorities ought to make the 
main decisions in the two fields of training and regional languages.  In Brittany, the 
region comes out ahead of other levels – national, local or European. In the case of the 
Breton language, the Regional council is identified as the appropriate level by a 
majority of respondents (53 per cent). This is all the more remarkable in that the 
region has no formal responsibility for taking decisions concerning language and does 
not have a particularly active record in this area. Unlike in Wales, for example, there 
has been no effort, even symbolic, to use Breton in Regional Council proceedings.  
Until 1998, the Region provided grants to the Breton-medium DIWAN schools and to 
a host of Breton cultural movements, but successive regional majorities fought shy of 
taking a firm position on promoting the Breton language. Following the exceptional 
circumstances of the 1998 regional election in Brittany, there has been a marked 
change. The Centre-Right (UDF-RPR- DL) list only held onto the majority as a result 
of a deal struck with four autonomist-minded independents, led by Jean Yves Cozan, 
a UDF dissident from the Finistère department.  Cozan was offered a new portfolio – 
Breton Identity. Occupying a pivotal position within the Regional Council, Cozan has 
used his influence to increase the culture budget and to create a set of institutions to 
promote the use of the Breton language.  The creation of the Breton Language Office 
(Ofis ar Brezhoneg) in 1999 heralded the new priority adopted by (or imposed upon) 
the Brittany Region in favour of the Breton language. Increased budgets for Breton 
language and culture followed. Despite the paradox of a hesitant region adopting 
stronger policies in favour of the language, the importance of this finding in favour of 
the region should be emphasised. The French government is seen not only as too 
distant, but also too ambivalent towards the Breton language which our findings 
indicate is viewed with a capital of cultural sympathy, even though its use is marginal. 
 17 
These findings are a clear challenge to the traditional viewpoint of the French 
government in favour of a system of national linguistic uniformity. Other political 
institutions – local government and the European Union – are not considered as 
serious contenders for the exercise of influence in this area.  
 
The findings for training policy provide further support for the regional level. 
Training is the interdependent policy domain par excellence; there are many policy 
stakeholders involved. The region is in charge of youth training – of 16 to 26 year 
olds – and has a growing influence in continuing and adult education. The French 
State retains control over many training programmes and specific populations. The 
European Union is determined to push its own influence over regional training 
policies. Many French local authorities themselves (communes, inter-communal 
structures and départements) have launched their own training programmes. Social 
partners (trade unions and employers) are also far more active in training than in the 
language domain. Given this complexity, the high proportion of those considering 
training to be a regional policy domain adds to the legitimacy of regional intervention 
in this sphere.   
 
Our first series of questions allow us to deduce a strong underpinning of support for 
regional political institutions in Brittany, as well as a desire to enhance the regional 
level in some specific areas over the local, national and European levels. But we must 
be careful not to draw too many conclusions from these findings; this becomes 
apparent when we consider preferences for regional expenditure.  
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What priorities for regional action? Public Opinion and spending priorities in 
Brittany 
 
Regional public spending priorities are indicative not only of actual policy choices, 
but also of the beliefs in the appropriateness of public intervention at different levels 
in specific policy fields. Even in the most federally inclined system, for example, it 
would be difficult to imagine defence expenditure being a major priority for a sub-
national authority. On the other hand, services such as education or health can be 
organised at a variety of levels of territorial governance.  The findings presented 
below for Brittany demonstrate a realistic appraisal of the limited powers of the 
French regions, providing strong support for our third hypothesis. They suggest that 
Breton public opinion has fully integrated the constraints of French decentralisation 
into its preferences. 
 
---Table Three --- 
 
The survey proceeded to an ask an open-ended question  (‘If your region had more 
money to spend, where should its first two priorities lie’) seeking to elicit the Breton 
public’s preferences for regional public expenditure. Table Three presents a hierarchy 
of the expressed first and second preferences.  
 
The Breton public’s regional expenditure preferences pinpoint issues of specific 
regional importance:  the environment, economic development, transport, tourism, 
training and culture. The first priority was the environment. Environmental issues are 
high on the political agenda in Brittany, which has to face specific challenges 
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unknown to most other French regions. In part this is a consequence of its 
geographical position as a peninsula at the western-most point of the European 
continent. Brittany has suffered from a string of ecological disasters, the most recent 
being the running aground of the Erika oil tanker in December 1999 (Gémie, 2001). 
Identifying the environment as the most important priority for regional expenditure is 
in part testament to the active record of the Brittany region in this domain and to the 
perceived proximity of the regional level.  It also represents a reaction against the 
failings of the French State.  Breton public opinion was harsh in its criticism of the 
regional prefecture and of the French Environment minister over the Erika affair. 
Paradoxically, the awareness of environmental issues has also been heightened by a 
reaction against the intensive farming methods of the type that for long underpinned 
the Breton agricultural model (Canevet, 1992). Awareness of the environmental 
damage caused by intensive farming (pollution, water contamination, and soil 
erosion) has been a painful discovery for one of France’s main agricultural regions.  
This finding backs up evidence from published monographs, which credit Bretons 
with a strong attachment to their natural environment (Le Coadic, 1998) We can also 
deduce an economic motive, as important sectors of the regional economy – farming, 
fishing and the agro-alimentary industry – depend on a clean environmental image 
and practice.   
 
The second priority for regional expenditure identified in the survey is economic 
development. There is an established post-war tradition of public intervention in 
supporting the Breton economy, whether through direct investment or through 
providing transport infrastructure. Brittany’s post-war economic take-off was driven 
from the mid-1950s by central state directed investments and priorities. In the 1960s 
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and 1970s, Brittany obtained more EEC funding than any other French region. From 
the early 1970s also, the Brittany regional council took part in the combined effort to 
pull Brittany into the post-war industrial era (Bignon, 2000). Under the leadership of 
nationally renowned political figures – René Pleven, Raymond Marcellin, Yvon 
Bourges -  the Brittany region established a reputation for efficient intervention in 
promoting economic development. Brittany’s post-war economic performance has 
been assisted by public intervention, but the region has also developed its own 
endogenous models of agricultural and industrial development, based on an ethic of 
social co-operation, political consensus and rural-urban equilibrium and exchange 
(Phlipponneau, 1996). The strong economic development of Brittany in the 1980s was 
consistent with the model whereby the creation of new industrial wealth is the most 
effective in traditionally non-industrial regions, where labour organisations are 
weaker and labour flexibility greater. The tailing off of growth in the 1990s 
highlighted the fairly narrow basis of Breton industry  (agro-alimentary, 
telecommunications, defence) and its dependency upon a cocktail of public contracts 
and external investment, as well as endogenous innovation. The importance of 
agriculture for the Breton economy, likewise, is a source of some anxiety given 
reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy and the crisis affecting intensive farming 
in the past decade. By distinguishing economic development as the second priority for 
regional expenditure, the Breton public again identified an area where regional action 
could (or should) make a difference. The two spending priorities of environmental 
policy and economic development illustrate a certain dilemma and uncertainty that 
Bretons face. On the one hand, they wish to continue their story of the Breton 
“economic miracle” (Le Bourdonnec, 1996) On the other hand, this very success, 
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based as it was on intensive agricultural methods, has endangered one of Brittany’s 
greatest assets, its reputation for unspoiled natural products.  
 
Transport-related issues (‘Improving the roads, public transport’) were the third most 
popular priority.  Ever since the early 1950s the opening-up (‘désenclavement’) of 
Brittany has been a major demand of Breton political and business actors.  The 
Brittany rail and roads plans of the early 1960s laid the bases for the development of a 
modern transport infrastructure (Martray, 1983). Improving the transport system has 
been a traditional demand of the Breton business community. This has been supported 
by the region’s principal decision-makers.  In our qualitative interviews, we identified 
the existence of rival advocacy coalitions over this issue. Most business and political 
actors favoured developing the region’s transport infrastructure, arguing for the 
extension of the fast speed train (TGV) to Brest as an absolute priority to alleviate the 
geographical isolation of Brittany. A minority of interviewees feared that an improved 
transport infrastructure would threaten Breton identity by bringing the region closer to 
the rest of France. Our poll suggests the former priority figures more prominently 
within public opinion at large. Not content to prioritise areas where the region can 
make a difference, Breton public opinion also appears to be anticipating change. The 
identification of transport-related issues as the policy province of the Regional 
Assembly augurs well for central government efforts to strengthen the responsibilities 
of the Regions in this area.  
 
Amongst the other priorities for regional expenditure we can identify three further 
areas closely linked to the specific attributes of Brittany: tourism, culture and training. 
Brittany is one of France’s major tourist regions. That Bretons look to the regional 
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authority to promote tourism supports the proximity argument; regional investment is 
appropriate because the Region has detailed knowledge of local conditions.  We 
might make a similar observation with respect to culture. It is entirely appropriate for 
the regional authority to promote culture, not only because culture is worth 
promoting, but also because it has a strong regional dimension. This is also the case 
for training, which, along with regional language policy, we subjected to more intense 
scrutiny. 
 
In Brittany, support for expenditure on regional languages was very low down the list 
of popular priorities. Fewer than 1 per cent (4 of 1007) spontaneously identified 
support for Breton as the principal preference for future Regional Council 
expenditure. We should exercise some caution when interpreting this figure. Priorities 
for public expenditure do not automatically equate with issue saliency.  In an area 
such as support for regional languages, policy objectives might be achieved with 
minimal additional public expenditure. And, as we demonstrated above, a majority of 
respondents identified the Region as the appropriate level for decision-making on 
language-related issues.  But there may also be an awareness that the Region can do 
little in this regard at present and the central state should be the target of pressure in 
this field.  
 
The case of training is rather different.  It is also widely considered that training ought 
to be a regional level responsibility (Table Two).  Unlike language policy, the French 
Regions have precise responsibilities in this policy area. We can surmise that regional 
preferences for increased spending on training (the public’s fifth first priority) are 
derived from a combination of Brittany’s specific training needs, an expectation of  
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public expenditure in this area and a cognisance of the actual policy responsibilities 
undertaken by the regional council. Training is also closely linked to economic 
development, which, as we have seen, is one of the two top priorities for public 
opinion.  
 
The Breton public’s regional expenditure preferences pinpoint issues of specific 
regional importance, rather than generic spending areas such as health and education. 
Table Three indicates expenditure preferences; it also reveals what regional 
authorities are perceived not to do. Consistent with our third hypothesis, we would not 
necessarily expect health to top the list of spending priorities for a French regional 
Assembly. The French system of health care is elaborately – and expensively – 
managed by a social partnership of employers and trade unions, increasingly closely 
monitored by the central state. The regions do not have any responsibilities therein 
(though the départements do).  The fairly low ranking of education is rather more 
intriguing. Though France prides itself on its national education system, implying 
uniform standards and practices throughout the country, French regions also have 
important responsibilities in secondary and higher education (Cole, 2001). The 
regions build and maintain upper secondary schools (lycées) and some universities, 
provide equipment, participate in educational planning and – of great importance in 
Brittany – can make grants to private schools.  Education is by far the largest 
spending item of all French regions, around 50% in the case of Brittany.  We surmise 
that, though there is intense interest in Brittany in education, this issue area is 
perceived primarily either as a national or a more localised policy responsibility. The 
Regional councils have not yet drawn much political capital from their major 
budgetary investment in education over the past fifteen years. Education is one area 
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where the central state has succeeded in shedding responsibilities to the periphery 
(regional councils and state field services) while retaining strategic control.  
 
Our second series of questions lead us to refine our argument somewhat. A logic of 
appropriateness appears to be at work. The Breton public favours a form of bounded 
regionality.  It wants regional public expenditure to be concentrated in areas where 
regional institutions might make a difference, or where the image of Brittany itself is 
involved. In the core public policy areas of health and education, there is a preference  
even in regionally minded Brittany for a system of national regulation, consistent with 
French public service doctrine, equality of standards and the legacy of 150 years of 
‘republican’ ideology.  
 
What Future for Brittany? 
 
The Breton public seems remarkably well informed of the practical politics of French 
regionalism as it currently operates.  But what are its preferences for the future? Table 
Four summarises responses to the key institutional question we posed in our 
comparative survey.  
 
Refuting our second hypothesis, our findings confirm the existence of a Breton 
regional political consciousness. We observe overwhelming support for consolidating 
or strengthening existing regional institutions. There is virtually no constituency for 
the status quo ante; regional institutions are fully accepted as part of the normal 
democratic process. They leave entirely open the question of whether the Breton 
public would support a more thoroughgoing regional, or federal evolution. 44 per cent 
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were in favour of retaining the current situation (a regional council with limited 
powers) and only 2 per cent wished to abolish it. On the other hand, the answers to 
this question reveal a sizeable minority of 34 per cent, which is “regionalist” in the 
sense of seeking greater powers for the regional council similar to those possessed by 
the Scottish Parliament (“an elected parliament with tax-raising and legislative 
powers”) and a further 12 per cent wish to see “an autonomous Brittany”. 2 
The autonomy solution is confined to the margins of the political spectrum, a 
discovery confirmed by the absence of support for a strong autonomist political 
movement. Yet,  the existence of a strong body of public opinion favourable to an 
accelerated regionalisation represents a challenge to the traditional model of 
bargained influence exercised by Breton politicians… one anticipated in advance by 
the increasingly regionalist theses espoused by Breton politicians of all ‘national’ 
parties  
 
                                                          
2
 These four alternatives were intended to capture a progressive scale of 
regionalisation. Though functional equivalence guided our survey design, the 
possibilities offered to public opinion differed slightly between Wales and Brittany, in 
order to take into consideration linguistic and cognitive differences. In the case of 
Wales, we offered independence as a solution, consistent with the wording of the 
Wales referendum survey of 1997. In the case of Brittany, upon the advice of our 
control group we preferred ‘autonomy’, the term used by the UDB. ‘Autonomy’ 
signifies a large measure of constitutionally enshrined self-government within a quasi-
federal system. It goes beyond the Scottish solution of  tax-raising and legislative 
powers which could, in theory, be reclaimed by the centre.  
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----Table Four around here ---- 
 
To what extent are these contrasting viewpoints embedded in distinctive attitudes or 
party preferences? We sought to investigate further by cross-tabulating identity and  
regional voting intentions with institutional preference. We also tested for 
relationships between a range of structural attributes (age, gender, socio-economic 
group, education, locality) and institutional preferences. Full analysis of these 
variables lie outside of the scope of the present article. We will limit our analysis here 
to identity and voting preference – both of which involve agency as well as structure - 
rather than structural attributes for the purposes of making distinctions within public 
opinion.  
 
---Table Five around here --- 
 
Does identity matter? We asked respondents to state whether they considered 
themselves to be more Breton than French (15%), equally Breton and French (57%) 
or more French than Breton (22%). In the case of Brittany, the median position – 
equally Breton and French -  overwhelmingly prevailed.  This is consistent with 
received images of Breton political culture and society. The sense of regional identity 
is strong, but this is not considered as being in opposition to an overarching French 
nationhood. Regional identity is not a surrogate nationality.  
 
Detailed analysis allowed us to explore certain relationships in more depth. As 
expected, clear relationships were established between identity and institutional 
preferences at the two extremes. Those considering themselves to be uniquely or 
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predominantly Breton were far more likely to advocate either a fully-fledged regional 
Assembly or an ‘autonomous’ statute for Brittany, than were those considering 
themselves to be primarily or entirely French. There also appears to be a clear 
relationship between the ability to speak Breton and an institutional preference in 
favour of greater regionalisation or autonomy. But the vast majority of respondents 
are neither Breton speakers, nor do they consider their identity as being primarily 
Breton.  
 
Do parties matter? We observed surprisingly few differences according to voting 
intention. PS voters were scarcely more favourable than RPR voters to enhanced 
regional autonomy.  These figures bear out the belief expressed in many interviews 
that institutional preferences cut across existing parties. Institutional choices can not 
be reduced to a simple left-right cleavage. The RPR President of the Brittany Region, 
Josselin de Rohan, might have a sceptical position on greater regionalisation, but 
many RPR voters do not share this view.  Likewise, while the PS leader Jean-Yves Le 
Drian has repositioned the Socialist Party in favour of greater regional autonomy, 
most Socialist voters are happy with existing arrangements.  In general terms, there 
has been an evolution of the French political class with regard to issues such as 
greater regional powers and the acceptance of minority languages.  Most national 
political parties are now divided with a pro-regionalist and pro-minority language 
wing advocating more decentralisation and a traditional “jacobin” wing ardently 
defending the unity of the Republic. 
 
These findings are consistent with existing representations of Breton political 
cleavages. There is a moderation of political conflict within the Brittany arena. 
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Moreover, national political parties are infused with Breton cultural values. There is 
also a distrust of political extremes, except in specific sub-cultural circumstances. 
While not going as far as to suggest a cross-partisan consensus on the broad issues 
facing Brittany, there is an underlying consensus to defend Breton interests to the 
outside world and limit political conflict.  
  
 
Conclusion 
 
The findings presented in this article back up the analysis of regional governance in 
Brittany as a meso-level phenomenon.  There is a marked sense of regional 
consciousness, based on a high measure of social consensus. Brittany is France’s most 
distinctive mainland region. Bretons are proud of their region within the French 
nation.  
 
In our introductory section, we developed four hypotheses, related to issues of Breton 
identity, autonomy, pragmatism and political opportunity structures.  The evidence we 
have presented here allows us to reject the first two hypotheses. Breton identity is 
strong and there is widespread support for regional political institutions.  While our 
findings allow us to establish the pertinence of the new regionalist problematic in the 
Breton case, our third and fourth hypotheses emphasise that theories of ‘new 
regionalism’ must be understood within the framework of an overarching state 
tradition that creates strong incentives for a system of national political regulation. 
While the majority of Bretons support the present institutions faute de mieux, a 
significant proportion would like them to be changed. Pragmatically, they accept that 
 29 
the current institutions will not be able to deliver all the regionalist promises they 
would like, but they support them anyway (hypothesis three). The Region is identified 
as the appropriate space for most matters directly affecting all Bretons: the regional 
economy, urban and rural development, environmental issues, culture, training, 
language, transport. We observe, at the very least, a form of bounded regionality, 
which provides firm bases for a move to more enhanced forms of regional governance 
at a later date. 
 
Above all, Breton regionalist political demands have traditionally been mediated by a 
system of national political parties.  The political opportunity structure of the French 
Fifth Republic has generally inhibited the explicit mobilisation by national political 
parties of regionalist themes. The great national political parties – RPR, UDF, PS – 
have eschewed a regionalist discourse as they represent interests across France. The 
power to influence decision-making at a regional level continues to be mediated by a 
system of national regulation. Breton politicians of all (national) parties have looked 
as a priority to exercise influence in Paris, there where power lies. The last three 
Presidents of the Brittany region  (Josselin de Rohan, Yvon Bourges and Raymond 
Marcellin) have all been nationally prominent Gaullist politicians, who have 
continued to occupy national elective offices while being regional president. Like his 
predecessors at the head of the Brittany region, the present incumbent, Josselin de 
Rohan, is also a Senator, who, in the derogatory opinion of one of his regional 
opponents, ‘governs  Brittany from Paris’. Our findings support our third 
(pragmatism) and fourth (political opportunity structures) hypotheses. 
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The survey findings reveal a dynamic tension between underlying demands for 
enhanced regional autonomy and a reluctance to challenge the status quo. Despite 
their strong regional identity, Bretons are fairly evenly divided between those seeking 
a radical change (46%), (with 34% seeking an elected parliament with tax-raising and 
legislative powers and 12% an autonomous Brittany) in the constitutional status of the 
region and those who wish to maintain the status quo (44%), as revealed in Table 
Four. There is little explicit support for the region to take on board a number of 
policies which might be deemed “regionalist”, for example, greater financial support 
for the Breton language or regional competency in areas such as health and education. 
Furthermore, there is no support in the regional council for autonomist parties.  This 
apparent surprise finding is not so surprising when placed in the context of the nature 
of the current regional institutions, which are not widely regarded as being, at present, 
the kind of region that Breton regionalists (that 46% of the population) would like to 
see eventually as their preferred form of regional government.  While Breton 
politicians have traditionally fought shy of raising potentially divisive issues - such as 
language – which emphasise the distinctiveness of France’s Celtic region, there is 
some evidence that change is afoot.  The decentralisation agenda of the new Raffarin 
government, which is the first to be led by a President of a Regional Council (Poitou-
Charentes), promises to create an environment where even Brittany’s reluctant 
regionalists are encouraged to envisage bolder solutions. 
 
Whether France’s partial and untidy decentralisation will be allowed to develop 
further will be one of the major questions for the new Raffarin government. Though 
we have not engaged in explicit comparison in this article, an explicitly comparative 
exercise would depict France as the only one of the five major European nations not 
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to be engaging in a form of polycentric state development on its mainland. Germany, 
Spain, the UK and Italy have each undergone developments that can in some senses 
be labelled as federal, or quasi-federal. Not so in mainland France, where the 
territorial uniformity underpinning the French State tradition outweighs in importance 
any cross-national moves towards emulation. We touch here at the core of state 
sovereignty which, in the French case, is intimately tied in with perceptions of 
national prestige and territorial hierarchy.  
 
We should qualify our remarks. If the Matignon agreement had run its course, by 
2004 France itself would have agreed to some legislative powers in Corsica, a major 
break with the principle of territorial equality across the Republic.  Though the 
Corsican problem remains unresolved, the Raffarin government  appears disposed  to 
support the principle of regional experimentation, allowing those regions which so 
desire to go further than others.  Brittany is the most distinctive of France’s mainland  
regions. There is a strong sense of regional distinctiveness, but also a deeply 
embedded reluctance to transgress the established order. It is unlikely that conformist 
Brittany will pose a direct threat to the integrity of the French State, unless the French 
State itself decides to lead the way. While respectful of established norms and 
processes, our findings suggest on balance that the Breton public would welcome a 
move towards greater regionalisation. The capacity to accommodate increased 
regional diversity will be a test for the long-term evolution of the French Republic 
itself.  
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